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 Introduction 
 
Recent mass shootings, such as at Sandy Hook Elementary School and in Aurora, 
Colorado, have brought attention to the issue of gun control reform. One side raises concerns 
regarding the 2nd Amendment. These individuals are worried that gun control will compromise 
their Constitutional rights. The individuals on the other side of the issue are concerned with 
public safety and feel that without gun control, lives of innocent people may be at risk. As 
politicians and the media debate stricter gun laws, what motivates public opinion and whether 
these opinions are as polarized as politicians suggest come into question. In this research, I 
address how partisanship frames attitudes toward gun control laws through an experimental 
design, to potentially identify the source and variation of perceptions. 
I argue that framing plays a major role in perceptions of gun control proposals. Framing 
is how information is presented and how people receive and interpret that information as it is 
presented. How information is framed is vital in determining whether individuals are likely to 
agree with the information.  Framing presents complex concepts in a deliberate fashion in order 
to elicit cognitive or emotional appeals that benefit the interests of the framer, engaging 
“different psychological processes” (Slothuus 2008) and altering emotions toward certain 
predispositions (Gross and Ambrosio 2004). For example, Brian Montopoli (2006) shows how 
influential framing is, in that the “Death Tax” elicits largely negative reactions while the “Estate 
Tax” does not. Montopoli also gives the example of framing in relation to abortion, referring to 
someone who is against abortion as “pro-life” as opposed to “anti-choice.”  If the goal is to get a 
group to agree with a concept, then the approach and the framing will differ greatly from the 
approach and framing used if the goal is to create opposition to a concept. The information that is 
presented is intentionally worded in order to achieve an overall goal of either generating support 
or opposition of certain issues. This trend is also seen when looking at hypothetical policies 
(Bishop, et al 1980). Bishop et al, show that when individuals are presented with hypothetical 
policies, they will provide opinions on them even though they are not real. This is extended in 
my paper as I use hypothetical policies to gauge opinion on gun control. Taking this concept 
further, Richard Morin (1995) replicated Bishop’s experiment adding partisan tags. His results 
show that more individuals respond to this hypothetical legislation when the partisan tag is 
present by drawing on these party cues. My experiment draws on this concept as well, as I use 
partisan cues to frame the hypothetical legislation presented.  
Previous research identifies how the media frames issues and its influence—in both how 
it influences public perceptions and how the public receives these messages (Scheufele 2000; 
Tuchman 1978). Druckman (2001) looks at the credibility of a source and its influences on 
framing and finds that the more credible a source is deemed to be, the greater the influence of the 
framing. This shows that framing can work with other factors in order to change public opinion. 
Frames must be politically salient; they tap into issues on which the target already has an 
opinion. Framing on its own, does not create as great of a reaction as does framing when 
matched with another concept. Brewer finds that “national interest frames in media coverage 
resonate with ordinary citizens” (2006). Framing is also evident in international news coverage: 
Nossek (2004) finds that the national identity of a news journalist and the journal’s editors 
inversely influence professional news values.1 
Appealing to partisanship, in itself, is a form of framing. Furthermore, partisanship as a 
framing device has already been shown to influence support for immigration in the United 
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 States. Rural voters agreed with Democrat immigration legislation when no party label was 
present, but when labeling was present, rural voters agreed with the Republicans (Bishop 2012). 
Looking at gun law reform from the approach of framing will give insight to why or why not 
individuals support gun law reform. While framing and party cues tend to be separated, my 
experiment is a combination of the two. The framing in my experiment is not attempting to tap 
into a particular value or emotional response; however, it is present to remind the respondent of 
the history of Democratic interests in gun control. 
 Simply put, when basic information is presented in marginally different ways, it can 
change the way individuals perceive it. The manipulation of framing on influencing public 
opinion has long been acknowledged but has not been adequately addressed in terms of gun 
control perceptions. Accordingly, I analyze how the framing of a question can influence whether 
or not people say they agree with gun control laws. If gun control is presented in a manner that is 
consistent with previous beliefs, such as a person’s partisanship, individuals would be expected 
to respond more favorably than if it is framed in a manner inconsistent with one’s previous 
beliefs. I captured framing through a web survey with a randomly selected group  receiving a 
question asking whether they would support a particular hypothetical gun control law—a 24 hour 
waiting period for a firearm—recently proposed by Democrats, while others received the same 
question framed as proposed by Congress. The goal of this analysis is to test whether perceptions 
of gun control laws would change in accordance to being told that either Congress or Democrats 
proposed this legislation.    
 Since 1959, Gallup has conducted polls on opinions on gun control that ask if participants 
have a gun in their home; however, people may feel uncomfortable answering this potentially 
intrusive question, especially when asked in person. Gallup also does not address the 
respondent’s direct ownership of the gun, whereas this anonymous experimental web survey 
does.2 Experimental web surveys have generated insights in social science, but they have not 
been extended to gun control research where framing would be expected to be present. Rather 
than simply asking one question about gun control, an experimental web survey allows for 
control over potentially influencing factors that result either in support or opposition for gun 
control. Furthermore, the results suggest not only the extent of support for a type of gun control, 
but how parties can frame this in their favor. The contribution of this paper is that it extends our 
knowledge of what influences gun control by connecting this issue to the broader literature on 
framing. 
 
Research Design and Hypotheses 
 
For analysis, I implemented a survey using Survey Monkey’s paid option to obtain an 
approximation of a random sample (517 respondents) of the American public in the summer of 
2013. While this may not be as close of an approximation as phone surveys, it does provide an 
affordable way to address framing. Though internet access is widespread in the U.S., Pew 
Research Center finds indicate that 13% of individuals do not use the internet (2014). This may 
have some influence on the representativeness of the sample; however, a web-based survey 
proves to be a more affordable approach. The participants were presented with a series of 
questions regarding demographics and political identification. From there, the survey asked a 
series of gun related questions, including how closely the individual associates guns with certain 
words in order to identify why partisan framing is likely to be successful as it conjures up these 
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 The difference here is that there may be a gun present in the house as opposed to someone directly owning it. 
 latent differences on how Democrats and Republicans view guns. Next, to test framing, 
respondents were randomly selected to receive either a question framed as Congress proposing 
gun control laws or Democrats proposing such laws.  Besides just measuring partisanship, this 
survey also asks an often overlooked question: whether or not the respondent personally owned a 
gun. 
 To address how framing and partisanship influence support or opposition of gun control 
laws, hypothetical gun control legislation is presented to respondents in a web survey. There are 
many advantages to using a web-based survey, especially in terms of time efficiency (e.g. 
Tourangeau, Rips, & Rasinski 2000). While access to the internet used to be a major concern in 
web survey samples (e.g. Fricker & Schonlau 2002; Wilson & Laskey 2003), this is much less a 
concern now as access expands (Scholl, Mulders, & Drent 2002).  n this case, gun law reform is 
analyzed by asking about hypothetical legislation with 24-hour waiting period for a firearm. This 
wording was chosen because, on its surface, it seems less controversial and fairly 
straightforward. Previous research suggests broad support for a 24-hour waiting period, whereas 
longer waits and stricter restrictions on particular weapons have been much more controversial. 
This wording also avoids potentially loaded terms such as “assault weapons.” It is hypothesized 
that when Democrats are presented with gun control framed as Democrat-led, they will be more 
likely to support the question (H1). Likewise, when Republicans are presented a Democrat 
frame, they will be less likely to support the question. This is expected because Republicans tend 
to be seen as against gun control, while Democrats are associated with being for stricter gun 
control laws. In contrast, less of a distinction should be evident when a Congress frame is 
presented as this is used as a baseline.  Respondents were randomly assigned to receive one of 
the following questions on gun control: 
 
1. Congress Frame: Congress has proposed a 24-hour waiting period for the 
purchase of a firearm. Ranging from strongly oppose to strongly approve, where 
would you place yourself on this scale? 
 
2. Democrat Frame: Democrats in Congress have proposed a 24-hour waiting period 
for the purchase of a firearm. Ranging from strongly oppose to strongly approve, 
where would you place yourself on this scale? 
 
While there is a strong emphasis on partisan framing in this study, gun ownership should 
also influence support. It is expected that gun owners will be less likely to support a waiting 
period on guns in general, regardless of whether it was framed as Congress or Democrats that 
proposed the waiting period (H2). This is expected because it makes the issue of gun control 
more personal. This thinking is that individuals who own guns may believe that gun control is 
not an issue because they feel that they are responsible with their guns. This personal 
identification may lead to a split in how individuals believe which particular gun control laws 
should or should not be implemented. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Analysis 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
  Of the total surveyed population, 40.8% identified as Democrat, and 28.7% identified as 
Republican. Only 33.9% of respondents stated they owned a gun, with little distinction between 
those who later received a Congress or Democrat frame (35.7% and 32.4% respectively). The 
Pew Research Center finds that “more than a third of Americans say they or someone in their 
household owns a gun. There are by various estimates anywhere from 270 million to 310 million 
guns in the United States—close to one firearm for every man, woman, and child” (2013). This 
shows the results yielded from my survey of the amount of Americans who say they own a gun, 
are representative of the United States. The similarities in gun ownership rates in both groups of 
the survey suggest that the later results are not driven simply by one group having a 
disproportional number of gun owners.  
Before the experimental question, the web survey also asks “in general, how strongly do 
you associate the following terms with firearms?” Table 1 reports the percentage of respondents 
identifying the terms to be closely or very closely associated with firearms, divided by partisan 
identification and including a Pearson Chi-Square.3 Only two of the terms, hunting and military 
service, show no statistically significant difference between Democrats and Republicans. In 
particular, Democrats associate firearms more with crime and danger than Republicans, while 
Republicans view firearms as closely associated with home security and self-defense.  
 
Table 1: Association with Firearms by Partisan Identification 
 
 Republicans Democrats   
 Pct. Pct. Coeff. Sig. 
Hunting 86.2 86.4 2.692 0.062 
Sport 62.3 38.4 27.626 0.000 
Home Security 73.8 41.6 39.523 0.000 
Self-Defense 80.6 48.8 45.954 0.000 
Crime 71.5 79.6 11.183 0.000 
Danger 47.1 72.4 30.627 0.000 
Military 
Service 88.8 87.5 3.023 0.554 
Patriotism 51.4 17.4 74.780 0.000 
 
These distinctions may partially explain the effectiveness of partisan framing if 
Democrats and Republicans start with a different perception of the role of guns. They also show 
that certain framing of gun control may not be as effective as others. For example, framing in 
terms of military service or hunting may not gain as significant of a response as using the other 
terms listed because there is not much of a partisan divide between these two terms.  
The mean response for people who received the question with the Congress frame was 
4.14 on a five-point scale from strongly oppose (1) to strongly approve (5), while the mean 
response for people who received the question with the Democrat frame was 4.2. This implies 
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 A Wilcoxon rank-sum test provides consistent findings as the Chi-Square tests and in the hypothesized direction.  
 that on average respondents supported a waiting period proposed by either Congress or 
Democrats. 
 
Table 2: Support for Gun Control by Partisan ID and By Framing 
(In Percentages) 
 
Framing Frame Congress   Democrats   
 Republicans Democrats N Republicans Democrats N 
Strongly Oppose 6.3 0.9 11 3.6 3 8 
Oppose 7.5 2.8 15 8.7 0 12 
Neither oppose or 
support 15.1 7.5 32 18.8 4 30 
Support 32.1 23.4 76 30.4 20 62 
Strongly support 39 65.4 132 38.4 73 126 
       
Pearson Chi-Square 20.772   34.425   
Sig. 0.00   0.00   
N 266   238   
 
Moving to perceptions of a waiting period, we again see distinctions by partisanship. 
Table 2 shows a cross tabulation on whether or not an individual supports a waiting period, 
broken down by party identification, when presented with the Congress frame.  Of those 
receiving the Congress frame, approximately 26.4% more Democrats than Republicans strongly 
supported a waiting period, with a Chi-Square test statistically significant at the .001 level.  
However, majorities of both Republicans and Democrats held favorable views of the waiting 
period overall. These results seem to suggest that there is less polarization on this minimalist gun 
control than one might have assumed.  As expected, the evidence in Table 2 also shows that 
when the question had the Democrat frame, Democrats were much more likely to strongly 
support a waiting period.  There is a 34.6% difference between Democrats and Republicans in 
terms of strongly agreeing with a waiting period. There is also a 7.6% increase in Democrats 
who strongly agree, and the percentage of Republicans remains about the same between both 
cases. This is, with a Chi-Square test, significant at the .001 level. This data implies that when 
Democrats see the Democrat frame, they respond more positively; however, there is little change 
in the response of individuals identifying themselves as Republicans in contrast to expectations. 
This supports the first hypothesis in that Democrats did respond more positively to the Democrat 
frame than to the baseline, Congress frame.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 3: Support for Gun Control by Gun Ownership and By Framing 
(In Percentages) 
 
Framing Frame Congress   Democrats   
 
Non-Gun 
Owner 
Gun 
Owner N 
Non-Gun 
Owner 
Gun 
Owner N 
Strongly Oppose 2.3 7.4 11 2.5 5.2 8 
Oppose 4.1 8.4 15 3.1 9.1 12 
Neither oppose or 
support 13.5 9.5 32 8.7 20.8 30 
Support 24.0 36.8 76 24.2 29.9 62 
Strongly support 56.1 37.9 132 61.5 35.1 126 
       
Pearson Chi-Square 14.201   18.381   
Sig. 0.007   0.001   
N 266   238   
 
Table 3 breaks down support by gun ownership. Among those receiving the Congress 
frame, non-gun owners were much more likely to strongly support a waiting period. There is an 
18.2% difference in the gun owners and non-gun owners for strongly supporting a waiting 
period, statistically significant at the .01 level. Despite the divergence, both groups are generally 
receptive to the waiting period. Therefore, merely being a gun owner does not make an 
individual opposed to this form of regulation. However, it does imply that gun-owning 
individuals, perhaps, may be more cautious of the reform. This would be consistent with the fear 
of a slippery slope; gun owners are cautious of this reform because it could eventually lead to 
even stricter gun control laws. When presented with the Democrat frame, again a majority of 
both gun owners and non-gun owners approved of a 24-hour waiting period. Non-gun owners are 
26.4% more likely to strongly agree with a waiting period when they received the question with 
the Democrat frame, statistically significant at the .001 level. There is a 5.6% increase in the 
amount of non-gun owners in agreement with a waiting period from the question with the 
Congress tag than to the question with the Democrat tag. While this is a significant difference, 
the Democrat tag had a slightly greater influence on individuals identifying as Democrats. The 
number of gun owners who strongly agree with a waiting period stays relatively the same 
between the two questions; however, 6.9% fewer gun owners supported the 24-hour waiting 
period with the Democrat frame. While majorities are generally supportive of the wait, divergent 
effects between gun and non-gun owners show when framed as Congress proposed vs. 
Democrats proposed, consistent with H2. Tables 2 and 3 suggest a potential connection between 
gun ownership and partisanship, in terms of the influence of framing, but on their own cannot 
identify which variable is more influential. 
In sum, cross tabulations that use the independent variable of party identification give us 
useful information in regards to framing. It is supported that a partisan tag does influence 
whether or not individuals agree with gun law reform when looking at party identification. It is 
also implied that most individuals are generally supportive of a waiting period; Democrat 
support however, is stronger. 
The cross tabulations regarding gun ownership yield interesting conclusions as well, 
inferring that having a partisan tag does influence gun owners’ and non-gun owners’ support of a 
 waiting period. This also suggests that there is a connection between whether or not an individual 
owns a gun and an individual’s party identification. It is supported that individuals respond 
positively to their own party identification, consistent with the partisan hypothesis. 
 
Regressions 
 
Table 4: OLS Regression on Support for Gun Control 
 
 Congress   Democrat   
 Coeff. SE sig. Coeff. SE sig. 
Democrat 0.533 0.138 0.000 0.577 0.135 0.000 
Gun Owner -0.221 0.141 0.118 -0.416 0.143 0.004 
Constant 4.004 0.107 0.000 4.094 0.105 0.000 
N 266   238   
Adjusted R2 0.073   0.127   
 
For a more rigorous analysis, Table 4 presents OLS regressions under each frame 
(Congress or Democrat) with a five-point dependent variable measuring whether or not an 
individual supports a waiting period. The independent variables include party identification (a 
dummy variable for Democrats) and whether or not an individual is a gun owner. The results 
show, when presented with the question with Congress framing, being a Democrat is associated 
with a 0.53 point increase in support for a 24-hour waiting period, statistically significant at the 
.001 level. Being a gun owner is associated with a 0.22 point decrease in support for the waiting 
period. This approaches but does not reach statistical significance (.118). Identifying as a 
Democrat has a greater relative influence on an individual’s agreeing with a waiting period than 
being a gun owner does when an individual is presented with the Congress framed question. 
When presented with the Democrat framed question, Democrats are associated with a 0.57 point 
increase in support for the waiting period, statistically significant at the .001 level. Meanwhile, 
gun owners are associated with a 0.42 point decrease in support for the waiting period, 
statistically significant at the .01 level. The Democrat frame model has a much higher R2, 
suggesting again the importance of framing differences. Also, gun ownership only seems to 
matter when the partisan frame is present even after controlling for partisanship. This implies 
that when the waiting period is Democrat-sponsored, gun owners appear suspect regardless of 
partisanship. This finding shows that it is not just partisanship that matters regarding support of 
gun control laws, but it is partisanship as well as gun ownership working together that creates 
these perceptions.  
Table 5 shows expanded OLS regressions with added controls of gender (female), age, 
education, and the South (determined by Census classification of regions). Even with these 
added variables, gun owners are still much less likely to support the waiting period when the 
Democrat frame is presented, and this is still statistically significant. When looking at the control 
variables, women and individuals with more education respond positively to the waiting period 
with both frames. Both of these groups respond more positively, however, when the Democrat 
 frame is present, and the findings are only significant with the Democrat frame. It is unclear why 
this is so, but it may be partially explained by partisanship, in that both women and individuals 
with more education tend to be Democrat. Between the expanded regressions, it is seen that the 
Democrat frame, while still positive, does not have as much influence compared to the earlier 
models on people who identify as Democrats.  
In contrast, the difference in the two regressions is clear when looking at gun owners. 
Gun owners appear much more likely to respond negatively when presented with the Democrat 
framed question, supporting H2. These models control for Democrats, leaving other parties as a 
baseline. While most of the individuals are Republican, some were not; therefore, I ran the 
models with only Democrats and Republicans, and the results are consistent with my original 
models.4 
The regressions show similar findings to the cross tabulations. When presented with the 
Democrat frame, Democrats responded more positively; however, there is a significant 
difference in the response of gun owners.  When presented with the Democrat frame, gun owners 
respond much more negatively. This implies that gun owners are less likely to support gun law 
reform, even after controlling for partisanship, if framed as Democrat-initiated.  However, party 
identification still has a greater relative influence in all but one model, and that is consistent with 
the findings presented in the cross tabulations.   
In sum, the first hypothesis (Democrats will be more likely to support a waiting period 
when it is presented by Democrats) finds support. Both the cross tabulations and the regressions 
show that when the Democrat frame is included, individuals identifying as Democrats strongly 
support the waiting period at a higher rate. However, Republicans did not respond more 
negatively. In fact, the responses of Republicans stayed very similar in all of the tests. This could 
possibly be explained by the 24-hour waiting period not being a controversial reform. As far as 
partisanship goes, Republicans may have seen the waiting period as non-threatening even with 
the Democrat frame. The second hypothesis (gun owners will be less likely to support a waiting 
period regardless of the framing) is somewhat supported.  The gun owners strongly supported a 
waiting period much less frequently than non-gun owners; however, they tended to be generally 
supportive. In contrast, gun owners responded more negatively with the Democrat frame, and 
non-gun owners responded more positively with the Democrat frame. Gun owners, even after 
controlling for partisanship, respond more negatively to the Democrat frame. This suggests 
something beyond just mobilizing partisan feelings. One potential explanation is that references 
to Congress are interpreted as more abstract than a party label, although this requires further 
testing. It could also be that while Democrats are supportive in general, the framing of the 
waiting period as a Democratic initiative concerns gun owners in a negative way and might lead 
them to feel that the Democratic Party may be “selling them out.” The abstractness versus 
concreteness of a party label might be an explanation for this, just as Fenno’s Paradox partially 
explains high evaluations of one’s own legislator versus low evaluations of Congress in general 
(Fenno 1978). 
 
Conclusion 
 
The study addresses the influence of both partisanship and gun ownership on framing gun 
control support. First, there are clear, perceptual differences regarding guns. Democrats and 
Republicans have predisposed attitudes towards guns that influence their perceptions of guns. 
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 Second, the majority surveyed supports the 24-hour waiting period. Between all of the models, 
no one group was overwhelmingly opposed to this type of regulation. Third, there are clear 
differences in support based on framing. The Democrat tag yielded positive reactions from 
Democrats and negative reactions from gun owners regardless of partisanship. 
One issue to consider is how much of the findings are actually based upon the 24-hour 
waiting period. I also collected data on the regulation of different types of weapons such as 
single shot, semiautomatic, shotguns, and pistols. These regulations yielded more opposition 
than the 24-hour waiting period with the same general patterns between Democrats versus 
Republicans and gun owners versus non-gun owners. This implies that the type of firearm might 
matter when it comes to perceptions on gun control laws. 
Another point worth mentioning is the decision not to use the term “assault weapon.” It 
was not used because it was thought to have been a potentially loaded word. When considering 
what terms would be less loaded, the argument of framing would seem to work in this case as 
well. My survey asked about a ban on “assault weapons” with an even more polarized response 
by partisanship and gun ownership. However, it may be that the two sides may be defining 
“assault weapon” very differently. 
A clear implication of this research is how parties should frame gun control for their 
benefit. For example, for the Democratic Party leadership, the results here suggest that one 
should frame 24-hour waiting periods as bi-partisan and not try to take ownership of the measure 
as it appears to drive gun owners away at the same time as it encourages support among co-
partisans. For the Republican Party leadership, one should frame it as something other than a 24-
hour waiting period as this has broad support regardless of partisanship or gun ownership. 
Ultimately, this research identifies not only the influence of framing on gun control perceptions 
but the limits of the polarization on the issue as well. 
There is more we do not understand about why individuals support or oppose gun law 
reform. Future research should address how party identification and gun ownership interact. One 
way to look into this would be to analyze the feelings of gun owners toward Democrats in order 
to identify why gun owners seem to respond more negatively to the Democrat frame. Also, it 
would be valuable to see if other forms of gun control yield a similar pattern. Clearly, other 
variables beyond region should be considered as well, although Carlson cautions that “relying 
too much on the rural/urban divide across states obscures how this plays out within states” 
(2013). I would have liked to have controlled for National Rifle Association membership and the 
amount of exposure to guns an individual has had. Nonetheless, this initial analysis suggests the 
extent in which framing influences public opinion on gun control. 
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 Appendix 
Models with Only Democrats and Republicans 
 Congress    Democrat   
 Coeff. SE Sig.  Coeff. SE Sig. 
Democrat 0.509 0.149 0.001  0.497 0.150 0.001 
Gun Owner -0.267 0.156 0.088  -0.478 0.162 0.004 
        
Constant 4.036 0.132 0  4.184 0.128 0 
N 200    185   
Adjusted R2 0.091    0.127   
        
 Congress    Democrat   
 Coeff. SE Sig.  Coeff. SE Sig. 
Democrat 0.452 0.153 0.004  0.313 0.154 0.044 
Gun Owner -0.254 0.165 0.124  -0.401 0.163 0.015 
Female 0.305 0.153 0.047  0.448 0.145 0.002 
Age 0.204 0.089 0.023  0.028 0.088 0.754 
Education 0.051 0.076 0.5  0.173 0.073 0.019 
South 0.030 0.166 0.858  -0.251 0.152 0.099 
        
Constant 2.527 0.581 0  2.893 0.492 0 
N 194    182   
Adjusted R2 0.112    0.185   
 
 
 
 
 
 
